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In The Life and Strange Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe
of York, Mariner,' the popular eighteenth century novel by Daniel
Defoe, the shipwrecked Crusoe is stranded on an island with a friendly
"savage" he calls Friday. As one might imagine, there is little reference to law in Defoe's novel, and clearly it would be difficult to have
much of a legal system in a world with only two inhabitants. But the
limitations such an imaginary world would necessarily impose on a
law of torts seem all too important nevertheless. As I see it, many
doctrinal conflicts in traditional tort law, and many current controversies about tort reform, including several fueled by the American Law
Institute's erstwhile project on Compensation and Liability for Product
and Process Injuries,2 are products of our persistence in thinking about
torts as though every injured person and his or her injurer were a
Friday and a Crusoe alone on an island.

* Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. J.D., Harvard Univer-

sity, 1958; B.A., University of California at Berkeley, 1955.
1. DANIEL DEFOE, THE LIFE AND STRANGE SURPRISING

ADVENTURES OF ROBINSON

CRUSOE OF YORK, MARINER (1719).

2. At its October, 1991 meeting, the Council of the Institute decided to conclude the
Compensation project, and to undertake instead the preparation of a Third Restatement of
Torts. See 14-1 A.L.I. Rep. 1, 3 (1991).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 96, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 8

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

I.

[Vol. 96:169

THE ROBINSON CRUSOE PERSPECTIVE

To appreciate the limitations inherent in a Robinson Crusoe perspective on fort law, and the conflicts those limitations create, one
need only consider how some possible scenarios involving Crusoe and
Friday could be addressed legally.
Suppose that Crusoe had wrongfully made off with some property
of Friday's. If only because corrective justice calls for the rectification
of wrongful losses and gains, 3 we would probably have little hesitation in concluding that absent a return of the property, we ought to
both (1) compensate Friday financially for his loss, and (2) make
Crusoe pay financially for his wrongdoing. Further, we might well
conclude that (3) the amount that Friday should receive and the
amount that Crusoe should pay are the same: the value of the property
taken at a particular point in time. So far so good.
But suppose instead that it was some third party interloper who
had wrongfully taken Friday's property, and then sold it as his own to
an unsuspecting Crusoe before departing the island. Friday has still
suffered a wrongful loss, and in the first instance it seems as though
he should be compensated. But what reason could there be to make
Crusoe pay? Probably only one: on our island, there is simply no one
besides Crusoe for compensation to come from. (By this reasoning,
Crusoe might be required to share some of Friday's loss even if the
interloper had taken the property with him, and Crusoe had never seen
it). Indeed, the lack of other reasons to make an innocent Crusoe pay
might conceivably make us think again about the desirability of compensating Friday.
Turning to a different kind of injury, suppose that Crusoe had
bumped into Friday, causing him serious physical injury. Here again,
Friday probably ought to get some compensation however the accident
occurred, at least if it was not entirely his own fault. We may feel
compassion for the burdens the injury is imposing on Friday; and the

3. Jules L. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part II, 2
LAW & PHIL. 5, 6 (1983) [hereinafter Coleman, Moral Theories Part II].
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assurance of compensation might affect in desirable ways his attitudes
and behavior before or after the accident.4 But how about making
Crusoe pay? That makes sense if he intended the injury, or was negligent: we want to deter such conduct. It may also make sense that he
should bear losses as a cost of engaging in other conduct that created
obvious risks of serious harm.5 But what if his activities did not seem
risky at all?
In the words of Professor Jules Coleman:
An argument sufficient to justify a claim for recovery need not suffice to
justify imposing liability on a particular injurer. In other words, there
might be reasons of one kind to support the proposition that B (a victim)
ought not to shoulder his own losses, without those reasons proving sufficient to warrant shifting B's losses to A (his injurer).

Once more, however, if Crusoe doesn't pay, Friday can't be compensated.
Suppose that Crusoe ought on principle to pay in the accident
situation. How much should he pay? The same amount whether his
conduct was intentional, negligent, or merely risky? The same amount
whether serious harm, or only minor harm, was foreseeable? And how
likely is it that any amount we think Crusoe should pay will exactly

4. With regard to pre-accident behavior, an assurance of compensation might encourage a person to act in a certain way notwithstanding a risk of being injured by others if he
or she does so. Thus, it could be argued that compensating a dockowner for damage caused
to his or her dock by a ship kept tied to the dock in a storm will encourage dockowners
to allow ships to remain at their docks rather than cut the ships loose (which they might
otherwise be tempted to do notwithstanding potential liability for any harm to the ships that
eventuated). See CLARENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR., MORRIS ON TORTS 41 (2d
ed. 1980). But see infra note 28.

The avoidance of post-accident acts of self-help recoupment or revenge by injured
parties or their families or friends is a well-accepted goal of tort law.
5. Heading off acts of revenge by victims might provide a reason to inflict some
financial pain on some injurers, as well as a reason to provide compensation. But is difficult to understand why, in the real world, injured parties would care who actually compensated them or who received payment from their injurers (or why any effort should be made
to try to force an equalization or compromise of differences in the needed sums of compensation and payment).
6. Jules L. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part 1, 1
LAw & PHIL. 371, 383 (1982) [hereinafter Coleman, Moral Theories Part I].
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coincide with the amount we think Friday should receive? If they
don't coincide, on an island, what then?
Finally, and conversely, suppose it seems clear that in the interests
of deterrence or risk internalization, Crusoe should be required to pay
a rather large sum for having engaged in the conduct he engaged in.
But suppose it is not clear that Friday should receive nearly as much,
if anything, by way of compensation: perhaps Friday's injury was very
slight; perhaps he luckily and barely escaped any injury; or perhaps his
own fault played a major role in the accident. What would we do with
Crusoe's money? Throw it in the sea? Maybe that problem would
prompt us to think again about holding Crusoe liable.7
Thus, on our fictional island, conflicts would arise whenever there
was a discrepancy between the strength of the case for compensating
the plaintiff in a certain amount and the strength of the case for holding the defendant liable for the same amount. There would be no way,
again in Professor Coleman's words, to "separate the victim's claim to
recompense from the grounds for imposing liability upon his injurer,"8
or to deal with situations in which the victim's loss and the injurer's
gain are not equal, which, when corrective justice applies, "they rarely
are.")9 However, in the real world of American tort law, where plaintiffs can receive compensation from various sources, and defendants
can be required to make payments to the public generally instead of to
any particular individual, such conflicts should not exist. But in fact
they have long existed.
II. THE CRUSOE PERSPECTIVE IN TRADmONAL TORT LAW

Anglo-American tort law has had particular difficulty in dealing
with situations in which a party who is innocent of any wrongdoing
has been injured by another innocent party, and neither can bear the
loss in question significantly better than the other, through insurance or

7. Thus, in the real world, even an attempt to kill someone has not traditionally
given rise to tort liability if the actor did not succeed in touching the would-be victim and
the victim was unaware of the attack.
8.
9.

Coleman, Moral Theories Part I, supra note 6, at 383.
Coleman, Moral Theories Part II, supra note 3, at 14.
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by passing it on to users of its goods or services. As it is difficult for
a court to either deny an innocent victim compensation or penalize an
innocent actor, it is hardly surprising that we have something of a
crazy quilt of decisional doctrine pertaining to such situations-doctrine that finds sometimes for plaintiffs and other times for
defendants.
When the owner of property has lost it to a thief, the owner can
recover its value from a bona fide purchaser, with the courts focusing
on promoting security of ownership and not on the security of property
transfers. But when the owner has lost the property by fraud to a con
artist, the bona fide purchaser wins, with security of transfers now
elevated above security of ownership.1° Similarly, an actor who uses
reasonable force against someone that the actor reasonably, but mistakenly, believes is attacking him or her is clearly not liable for tort
damages;" but when an actor who causes injuries trying to defend a
third person from an apparent attacker has made a reasonable mistake
about who attacked whom, the actor is held liable according to2 at least
some courts, as having stood in the shoes of the third person.'
Other well-known tort decisions hold that a bystander who is
injured by a runaway taxi cannot recover from the taxi company
whose driver had reasonably jumped from the cab in an emergency
effort to protect himself from an armed robber passenger; 13 but a dog
owner whose dog was killed by a hunter who reasonably believed it
was a wolf can recover.' 4 Lenient standards of care protect disabled
persons and children, who were not able to act in less risky ways,
from liability to those they injured, but do not protect the mentally
ill.',

10.

See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §

15 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].

11. Id.at § 19.
12. Id.at § 20.
13. Cordas v. Peerless Transportation Co., 27 N.Y.S.2d 198 (N.Y. City Ct., N.Y.
County 1941).
14. Ranson v. Kitner, 31 111. App. 241 (1888).
15. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, at § 32.
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Certainly, there are factual and policy differences between some of
these cases that can sometimes produce slight variations in the basic
strength of the case for compensating the innocent plaintiff, or the
basic weakness of the case for making the innocent defendant pay.
When the law gives the courts no choice but to decide for one party
or the other, and to do so on an all-or-nothing basis, these differences
provide as good reasons as any for a decision. But it would be a
delusion for judges, lawyers, law students, or commentators to imagine
that the resultant decisions are correct in any ideal sense. Indeed, it is
difficult for me to believe that in any of the cases in question the
decision reached is really preferable to a compromise decision that
would let each party bear half the loss, which Professor John E. Coons
has proposed as a resolution of the conflicts presented by some dis16
putes between innocent parties.
But why should situations involving innocent victims and innocent
actors present conflicts that need to be compromised? Why can't innocent victims be compensated in full (except perhaps in the case of true
owners of stolen property and the like for some small reduction to
discourage carelessness) without innocent actors having to pay anything
(other than perhaps in the case of purchasers of stolen property and
the like some small sum to, again, discourage carelessness)? The answer seems to be that the law has been operating from a Robinson
Crusoe perspective that assumes that there is no one besides the actor
for the compensation to come from.
American tort law has also acted as though it was confronting a
conflict in dealing with situations involving two "guilty" parties: that
is, situations in which a person was injured while engaging in wrongful conduct by another party whose actions were also wrongful. With
regard to intentional torts, the classic example is the case of Katko v.
Briney, 7 in which an injured burglar recovered full tort damages
from the owner of an abandoned farmhouse who set up a spring gun
inside the house, presumably because the actor's conduct was much

16. John E. Coons, Compromise as Precise Justice, 68 CAL. L. REV. 250 (1980)
(focusing on conflicts between the true owners of wrongfully taken personal property and
bona fide purchasers).
17. 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971).
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worse than his victim's. By contrast, however, to two innocent parties
situations, some courts in cases involving two intentional wrongdoers
have rejected the all-or-nothing approach in Katko, and have compromised the conflicts by reducing the damages recoverable by the plaintiffs, 8 and forty-six states use the doctrine of comparative fault to
reduce the amount that negligent defendants have to pay to negligent
plaintiffs.' 9 Still, why can't guilty actors be required to pay all that is
in question without all of the money
necessary to deter the conduct
20
victims?
going to guilty
Further, tort law has had to deal repeatedly with situations in
which there is no coincidence between the amount that an innocent
plaintiff reasonably should receive as compensation and the amount
that the defendant who injured him or her should have to pay in the
interests of deterrence. Although in the real world such situations do
not need to create conflicts, the law's desert island-like insistence on
coming up with a single "right" amount, has led again to inconsistent
patterns of either-or decisions. For example, there currently exists a
deep split in authority whether parents whose lives have been disrupted
by the unwanted birth of a child, albeit a healthy child, can recover
from a physician who negligently performed a steriliation procedure

18. See Jake Dear & Steven E. Zipperstein, Comparative Fault and Intentional Torts:
Doctrinal Barriers and Policy Considerations, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1984); Gail D.
Hollister, Using Comparative Fault to Replace the All-or-Nothing Lottery Imposed in Intentional Torts Suits in Which Both Plaintiff and Defendant Are at Fault, 46 VAND. L. REV.
121, 123-24 n.3 (1993). Some commentators have argued strongly for the application of the
doctrine of comparative fault in intentional tort cases. See, e.g., id.; Jeff L. Lewin, Comparative Negligence in West Virginia: Beyond Bradley to Pure Comparative Fault, 89 W.
VA. L. REv. 1039, 1080-84 (1987).
19. See Hollister, supra note 18, at 123 n.2.
20. Abandoning the Robinson Crusoe perspective presents a challenge to the law generally, not just to tort law. For example, in Erickson v. Desert Palace, Inc., 942 F.2d 694
(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1476 (1992), the court relied on a Nevada statute
that channels all claims on gaming debts through a state administrative process to dismiss a
claim to a $1 million jackpot by a minor, who gambled in violation of state law. But suppose that the jackpot had already been paid by the casino .to the minor in ignorance of his
age, and then the casino tried to recover it. While the policy behind the law against gambling by minors might well justify stripping the young man of his gains, what justification
could there be for permitting recovery by the casino (in excess of some reward, as it were,
for bringing the suit)? Would it be other than fanciful to imagine that the casino had
anticipatorily factored the possibility of such recoveries into its financial plans?
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the costs of raising the child to adulthood, in addition to medical expenses and other damages directly related to the pregnancy. 2' As one
basis for denying childraising expenses, the Wyoming Supreme Court
has stated its belief that in at least some circumstances, "the injury is
out of proportion to the culpability of the tortfeasors .. .."' Thus,
the courts are presented with an unnecessary choice between inadequate compensation or excessive penalization of defendants.
The same kind of conflict, though with the situations of the parties reversed, is apparent in cases in which negligent defendants created extremely serious risks to the lives of other people generally, but
happened to kill only persons who would have died prematurely, or
been severely injured, anyway. Again, not surprisingly, the decisions
are inconsistent. In the well-known case of Dillon v. Twin State Gas
& Electric Co.,23 the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the
estate of a boy who was electrocuted by the defendant's dangerously
exposed power line as he began to fall from a bridge on which he
was playing could recover at most the loss of his potential future earnings as a cripple. On the other hand, when confronted recently with a
case in which a landlord's negligence in failing to inspect the heating
system in her duplex resulted in the asphyxiation death of a tenant
who, unbeknownst to the landlord, had tested positive for HIV, the
Missouri Court of Appeals was liberal in admitting both expert testimony that referred to possible future life-prolonging drugs, and standard life-expectancy mortality tables.24 In this entirely avoidable conflict, deterrence seems for the moment to be winning out-but at the
cost of providing arguably excessive compensation.
Returning to a two innocent parties situation, one of the most
interesting examples of Crusoe thinking can be found in the reactions
of commentators to a case familiar to generations of first-year law
students, the 1910 Minnesota case of Vincent v. Lake Erie Transporta-

21. See Lovelace Medical Center v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603, 617-18 & nn. 1-3 (N.M.
1991) (text and footnotes collecting the authorities, in New Mexico Court of Appeals opinion attached as Appendix to New Mexico Supreme Court opinion).
22. Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982).
23. 163 A. 111 (N.H. 1932).
24. Kilmer v. Browning, 806 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
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tion Co. 25 In Vincent, the defendant shipowner was held liable for
damage to the plaintiff's dock caused by its ship, when the captain, in
the exercise of "good judgment and prudent seamanship, 26 kept it
tied to the dock in a storm. Obviously, what makes the decision interesting, and worthy of inclusion in casebooks, is mainly the weakness
of the case for making the shipowner pay for the damage. As one
teacher has observed, students are inclined to ask, "Why if the
shipowner had a privilege to destroy the dock, does he have to pay?
Neither the shipowner nor the dockowner was culpable, and the latter
[sic] did not benefit. He merely escaped impoverishment." 27
But taking for granted for the most part that the plaintiff
dockowner should receive compensation, 28 legal scholars and philosophers have seemed to assume that there must also be a good reason to
make the defendant pay it-that compensation and liability are just
two sides of the same coin-and they have struggled mightily, though
rather unsuccessfully, to articulate such a reason.2 9 They have proba-

25. 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
26. Id.
27. Dale W. Broeder, Torts and Just Compensation: Some Personal Reflections, 17
HASTINGS L. J. 217, 218 (1965).
28. But see id. at 231 (rejecting the argument that an assurance of compensation is
necessary to get the future cooperation of dockowners in not cutting lines, as assuming too
much legal knowledge); Coleman, Moral Theories Part I, supra note 6, at 390 (distinguishing between "background risks," which people should be expected to bear, and "non-background risks," for the imposition of which they should be compensated if a loss occurs).
Dicta in a later Canadian case endorsed the position of the dissenters in Vincent that the
dockowner assumed the risk of non-negligent damage. Munn & Co. Ltd. v. MV Sir John
Crosbie, 1967 CAN. L.R. 94, 100 (Ex. Ct. 1966).
29. The leading commentaries by legal scholars are cited in RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 56-60 (5th ed. 1990). See also Coleman, Moral Theories
Part II, supra note 3; Peter Westen, Comment on Montague's "Rights and Duties of Compensation," 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 385 (1985). Commentaries by philosophers that discuss
either Vincent itself, or the similar hypothetical of a backpacker in a severe storm who
breaks into someone else's cabin and consumes its contents, include Joel Feinberg, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 93 (1978); Phillip
Montague, Rights and Duties of Compensation, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 79 (1984); Judith
Jarvis Thomson, Remarks on Causation and Liability, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 101 (1984);
Nancy Davis, Rights, Permission and Compensation, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 374 (1985);
Phillip Montague, Davis and Westen on Rights and Compensation, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
390 (1985).
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bly sensed correctly that if the court had concluded that the defendant
should not have to pay for the damage, the court would have been
presented with a conflict. But the commentators have not explained
why such a conflict could not be compromised, or, more fundamentally, why such conflicts need to exist at all in other than a Robinson
Crusoe world.
Further, in its exclusive focus on the injured party and the actor
who caused the injury, the Crusoe perspective tends to foreclose consideration of the possibility that someone else ought to be required to
pay for the damage in question. As regards storm damage by a ship to

Some of the difficulties with some possible theories of shipowner liability have been
pointed out by other scholars who nevertheless favor liability. See Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401, 410, 426-27 (1959) (acknowledging that a shipowner who failed to pay compensation voluntarily is blameworthy only if it
was enriched); MORRIS & MORRIS, JR., supra note 4 at 40 (arguing that the shipowner in
Vincent was not enriched, but "merely escaped impoverishment," presumably in relation to
its most representative distribution of wealth, which unjust enrichment doctrine seeks to preserve); Coleman, Moral Theories Part I, supra note 6, at 388 (pointing out that if simply
imposing a nonreciprocal risk on another called for the imposition of liability for an injury,
a non-negligent motorist ought to be liable to a negligent pedestrian); Thomson, Remarks on
Causation and Liability, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. at 112-15 (concluding that if the captain
had been unaware that his actions would damage the dock, protection of the shipowner's
freedom to make plans without fear of disruption should preclude imposing liability merely
on the basis of causation); Phillip Montague, Rights and Duties of Compensation, 13 PHIL
& PUB. AFF. 79, 84 (1984) (suggesting that it is inappropriate to view persons in the
shipowner's position as incurring obligations of gratitude absent some reason to believe that
the other party would have been willing voluntarily to aid them).
Additionally, as persons in peril in this country have traditionally not been called on
to repay the provision of police, fire, and other emergency services, it is not at all clear
that even if the shipowner was enriched the enrichment (without repayment) was unjust.
(But the tradition may be changing due to government budget constraints. See, e.g., Climbers to Pay for Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1993, § 5 (Travel), at 3.) Nor is it clear
that the fact that the captain in Vincent was aware that his emergency actions would damage the dock made paying for the resultant injuries sufficiently predictable for the shipowner
that imposing liability could be equated with simply enforcing an express contract to make
payment in case of injury. But see, e.g., Feinberg, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable
Right to Life, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. at 102; Coleman, Moral Theories Part II, supra note 3,
at 16. Indeed, it has been argued that even express "hurricane clauses" that require
boatowners to remove their boats from marinas, on pain of paying for damages, may be
invalid as contrary to public policy because of the danger of removal to the boatowners.
James E. Mercante, That Sinking Feeling-A Boat Owner's Liability in the Aftermath of a
Hurricane, 17 NOVA L. REV. 1053, 1069-70 (1993).
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a dock for example, an argument might well be made that decisions in
cases like Ploof v. Putnam30 (which was discussed in Vincent), giving
shipowners a privilege to tie up at private docks in a storm, constitute
"judicial takings" of the dockowner's property for a public purpose, for
which just compensation from the government for resultant damage is
constitutionally required.31
The United States Supreme Court stated in its 1893 Monongahela
Navigation Company3 2 decision that the Just Compensation Clause
"prevents the public from loading upon one individual more than his
just share of the burdens of government, ' 33 and the Court has reiterated on numerous occasions this "principle of fairness"'34 that the
costs of measures that benefit the public as a whole should not be
placed, or allowed to fall, disproportionately on particular individuals
or discrete small groups.35 The protection of cargo ships and the consequent promotion of shipping plainly benefits countless persons in
addition to the owners of the ships that are eventually saved; and the
public as whole would have had to pay for the construction of public
docks, including the acquisition for them of private lakefront land, as a
more costly alternative to permitting existing private docks to be commandeered.36
30. 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908).
31. See generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449
(1990).
32. Monongahela Navigation Company v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
33. Id. at 325.
34. "The Fifth Amendment expresses a principle of fairness ......
United States v.
Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945);
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); Penn Central Transportation Company
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123, 147-48 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting);
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-83 (1980); San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v.
DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 512 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Pennell v. City of
San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 19 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting) (1988); Christy v. Lujan,
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989) (White, J., dissenting); Yee v. City of Escondido, Cal.,
112 S. Ct. 1522, 1528 (1992). See generally William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of
Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 583-88 (1972); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad
Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 CoLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1707-11 (1988).
36. Is one possible justification for the decision in Vincent that damage costs can be.
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No-fault insurance schemes, under which injured parties can get
compensation for their economic losses from their own, or their
injurers', insurance companies, without showing that the injurers themselves should pay, do represent a departure from Crusoe thinking-in
the interest of both compensating victims of non-negligent conduct,
and reducing the costs for lawyers and expert witnesses and other
"overhead" costs of administering the traditional tort system. However,
the Crusoe perspective continues to make it difficult for legal professionals, as well as the public generally, to recognize the connection
between tort law and the presence or absence of national health insurance and other social insurance programs.37
III. REQUIRING DEFENDANTS TO PAY, BuT NOT TO PLAINTIFFS
In their two-volume study, entitled Enterprise Responsibility for
Personal Injury, 8 the ALI Compensation Project's Chief Reporter,
Professor Paul Weiler, and his Associate Reporters, offered controversial tort reform proposals relating to punitive damages, pain and suffering damages, and the judicial treatment of payments from collateral
sources-each of which was hotly debated at the ALI's 1991 Annual
Meeting, 39 and each of which represented a foregone opportunity to
abandon the Crusoe perspective and look separately at the amount that

passed along more effectively to the public generally by holding shipowners liable than by
"leaving" them on commercial dockowners? Requiring the public, through the government,
to pay on a taking theory is, of course, different from simply allowing an injured party to
collect from a government fund set up to provide compensation when no one in particular
should be held liable. See infra part IV.
37. See Henry J. Reske, Study: Quayle Was Right . . . and Wrong, 78 A.B.A. J.,
June 1992, at 42 (discussing WERNER PFENNIGSTOR & DONALD G. GIFFORD, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LIABILITY LAW AND COMPENSATION SCHEMES IN TEN COUNTRIES AND THE

(1991)); Joel Havemann, Safety Net for Malpractice Has Fewer Holes in
Europe, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1992, at 1.
38. A.L.I. REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY,
Vol. I, The Institutional Framework (1991) [hereinafter REPORTERS' STUDY, Vol. I]; A.L.I.
REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPOINSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY, Vol. II, Approaches to Legal and Institutional Change (1991) [hereinafter REPORTERS' STUDY, Vol. II].
39. See 68 A.L.I. PROC. 153-78 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 PROCEEDINGS]. As a member
UNITED STATES

of the American Law Institute, the author attended the 1991 Annual Meeting, May 14-17,
in San Francisco, and was present at the discussions of the Reporters' Study.
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a defendant should be required to pay and the amount of compensation
a plaintiff should receive.
With regard to punitive damages, the Reporters proposed in their
study to limit the punitives that could be levied against a defendant to
a proportion of the compensatory damages recovered by the plaintiff.n' But at the Annual Meeting, observations were made from the
floor that, contrary to the proposal, large punitive exactions might be
justified, and indeed most needed, when highly dangerous conduct had
caused relatively minor injuries. 4 1 The Reporters did not really seem
to disagree with this point. 42 However, they were concerned in their
study about "the appearance of a windfall profit going to the plain43
tiff."
But why in other than a Robinson Crusoe world (a Crusoe world
in which payments by a defendant that did not go to the plaintiff
would have to be thrown into the sea) should a fully compensated
plaintiff collect any punitive award? If the answer is to prevent dangerous conduct by encouraging persons who have suffered minor injuries to sue as private attorneys general to punish and deter those who
hurt them,44 why at least in theory shouldn't the Reporters' suggested
possible minimum punitive award of $25,00045 also be the maximum
that any plaintiff would be allowed to keep, with any higher exaction
going into a government fund? To insure effective legal representation
against wrongdoing defendants, winning plaintiffs' attorneys might,
again at least in theory, be permitted to collect a reasonable percentage
of the sums received by the government, as well as those awarded to
their clients. Though rejected by the Reporters, 46 systems of punitive
damages that channel some of the award to the state have already
been adopted in nine states.47

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

REPORTERS' STUDY, Vol. II supra note 38, at 257-59.
1991 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 39, at 174.
Id. at 174-75.
REPORTERS' STUDY, Vol. II, supra note 38, at 259 n.49.
See id. at 238; REPORTERS' STUDY, Vol. I, supra note 38, at 26-27.

45.

REPORTERS' STUDY Vol. II, supra note 38, at 259.

46. See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
47. See Debra Cassens Moss, The Punitive Thunderbold, 79 A.B.A. J., May, 1993, at
86, 91; 2 JAMES D. GHIARDI & JOHN J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE
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However, in a strikingly Crusoesque decision, a divided Colorado
Supreme Court has held that legislation requiring a victorious plaintiff
to pay a third of whatever punitive damages he or she actually collected into a state fund constituted an unconstitutional taking of his or
her property.48 According to the court, the plaintiff developed sufficient expectations to acquire a property interest in the third of the
damages in question mainly by virtue of a statutory provision ("[The
state shall not have] any interest in the claim for exemplary damages
or in the litigation itself at any time prior to payment becoming due")
designed simply to insure that the state would not be competing with
the plaintiff during the lawsuit for a punitive award, or later for the
defendant's assets:
[The existence of the channeling legislation] might be read to defeat any
reasonable economic expectation on the part of the [plaintiff] . . . to the
whole judgment .

. .

. [But] given the legislative disaffirmance of any

stake in the exemplary damages award prior to collection, it would border
on the fanciful were we to characterize the [plaintiff's] .
a full satisfaction of the judgment as unreasonable . . .4

.

. expectation to

Well, of course Friday would expect to receive it all.50
§ 21.16 and App. 21A (1992) (reprinting statutes); Janie L. Shores, A Suggestion for Limited Tort Reform: Allocation of Punitive Damage Awards to Eliminate Windfalls, 44 ALA. L.

REV. 61, 88-89, 96-142 (appendix with excerpts from punitive damages reform legislation
nationally) (1992).
48. Kirk v. Denver Pub. Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991).
49. Id. at 272. The Colorado court cited McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F.

Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990) which struck down on equal protection grounds a Georgia
channeling statute that applied only to products liability cases. l at 272 n.8. The court in
McBride also observed that if punitive damages were channeled to the state, they would
become subject to the U.S. Constitution's prohibition against excessive fines, which the
Supreme Court in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 489 U.S. 1007 (1989),

held inapplicable to punitive damages collected by plaintiffs. The 7-2 decision in BrowningFerris may of course strike the reader as also reflecting a Crusoe perspective, in not giving
weight to the identical impact on defendants of fines and punitive damages. In any event,
the McBride case was settled out of court before it could be appealed. See Milo Geyelin,
States Claim Share of Awards in Liability Suits, WALL STREET JOURNAL, March 3, 1993, at
BI, Bll.
50. A Florida appellate court also found sarcasm irresistible in responding to the claim
that that state's channeling statute was unconstitutional. Gordon v. State, 585 So.2d 1033,
1035 n.3 (Fla. App. 3d Dist. 1991). Subsequently, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the
Florida statute. Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1647

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol96/iss1/8

14

Sellinger: Robinson Crusoe Torts

1993]

ROBINSON CRUSOE TORTS

Equally striking, however, in its abandonment of Crusoe thinking,
was a recent decision by an Alabama trial judge. Even without a statute, the judge directed that half of the punitive damages assessed
against a health insurance company for fraudulently inducing a plaintiff
with a cardiac condition to purchase a policy that did not cover the
condition should be paid to the American Heart Association (after the
plaintiff's attorney's fees were deducted)." The judge relied on a provocative earlier concurring opinion by Alabama Supreme Court Associate Justice Janie L. Shores, based on her LL.M. thesis at the University of Virginia, in which two other justices had joined:
I believe it is true that sometimes [a punitive] . . . award does constitute
an undeserved windfall to the plaintiff ....
In such cases, the court has
the discretion to order the defendant to devote a portion or all of the
amount to efforts to eliminate the conditions that caused the plaintiff's

injury.
In my opinion, the court may also order the defendant to pay part of
the award either to the state general fund or to some special fund that
serves a public purpose or advances the cause of justice ....
[Some states] . . . allocate punitive' damages [to the state] pursuant to
statute. The courts, however, have inherent authority to allocate punitive
damages ......

On appeal of the Heart Association decision, Justice Shores and her
two colleagues voted to uphold the allocation, though they would have
preferred in that case to see the punitive damages go to the state. 3
But the majority reversed, concluding simply that "viewed from the
plaintiff's perspective, the trial court's judgment effected a remittitur"
that was unauthorized 4 -in other words, a taking of something the
plaintiff could already have expected. The possibility of adopting Justice Shores' position only prospectively was not mentioned.55

(1993).
51. See Smith v. States General Life Ins. Co., 592 So. 2d 1021 (Ala. 1992).
52. Fuller v. Preferred Risk Life Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 878, 886-87 (Ala. 1991) (concurring opinion). See also Shores, supra note 47, at 89-95.
53. Smith v. States General Life Ins. Co., 592 So. 2d at 1025, 1028-29 (concurring
and dissenting opinions).
54. Id. at 1025.
55. Absent a statutory or common law rule denying plaintiffs some portion of punitive
damages awards assessed against defendants, or at least an adequate judicial warning that
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A second recommendation in the ALI Reporters' study was that
only seriously injured plaintiffs be allowed to recover pain and suffering damages, 56 and then only in accordance with guidelines that described particular injuries and attached dollar figures to them.5 7 Observing, however, that this proposal might both underpenalize defendants in terms of prevention, and overcompensate plaintiffs,58 the Reporters also discussed, but ultimately rejected, "a potential institutional
resolution of the tension between the compensation and preventive
functions of pain and suffering" 59: imposing on defendants "tort
fines" for causing pain and suffering that would be 6payable to the
government, instead of to the plaintiffs who sued them.
Finally, the ALI Reporters urged abolition of the traditional common law collateral source rule, which permits a plaintiff to recover
compensation from a defendant for losses that have already been reimbursed by public or private insurance, even when the plaintiff is not
required to hand over the duplicate compensation to the insurer.61 On
the floor of the Annual Meeting, some supporters of the present rule
defended double recoveries by plaintiffs as having been contracted for
through previous payments of insurance premiums; 62 other speakers,
-however, seemed willing only to excuse such recoveries as an unavoidable consequence of making defendants bear the full cost of the harms
they caused.63

such a rule might be adopted, a plaintiff would probably expect to receive the entire
amount, and might even rely in some way on receiving it all, however dubious the justification. Thus, an intermediate appellate court in California held recently that a plaintiff
whose lawyer failed to take steps to preserve a cause of action that probably would have
yielded punitive damages may recover the punitives as compensatory damages in an action
for legal malpractice. Merenda v. Superior Court of Nevada County, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 87
(Cal. Ct. App., 1992).
56.

REPORTERS' STUDY, Vol. II, supra note 38, at 220-21.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 221-30.
Id. at 212-13, 229.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 213-16, 228,
Id. at 179-82.
1991 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 39, at 153-55.
Id. at 156-60.
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But why, outside of a Crusoe world, are double recoveries unavoidable if defendants are to be held fully accountable? In the real
world, the collateral source rule and double recoveries could be eliminated, and defendants could still be required to pay full damages, if
the sums attributable to previously covered losses were to be paid into
a government fund instead of to plaintiffs.
IV. COMPENSATING INJURED PARTmS FROM GOVERNMENT FUNDS

A tort system free of Robinson Crusoe limits could utilize government funds created out of collateral source, tort fine, and punitive
damages payments from defendants generally to benefit deserving
plaintiffs who might otherwise be left uncompensated or
undercompensated because of weaknesses in the case for making the
particular defendants who injured them pay at all or as much as the
plaintiffs should receive 4. In Missouri, for example, fifty percent of
every punitive damage award goes toward building up a "Tort Victims
Compensation Fund."6
One potential use of a government compensation fund is suggested
by the ALI Reporters' recommendation that proof of a defendant's
compliance with all relevant standards prescribed by a public regulatory agency should be a defense to some forms of tort liability. 66 On
behalf of such a regulatory compliance defense, the Reporters argued
that adding possible tort sanctions to government regulatory requirements can pose a "risk of overdeterence of socially valuable activities"; 67 but they also recognized that allowing such a defense against
claims for compensatory damages could deprive an uninsured injured
64. See discussion supra part II.
65. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.675 (Vernon 1988). Channeling statutes typically allocate
the state's share to a special purpose fund. Andrew Blum, States Want Share of Punitives,
NAT. L.J., March 8, 1993, at 5, 35. Additional payments into tort compensation funds could
come from the exaction of damages for purposes of deterrence from tort defendants who
intended harm, or created serious risks of harm, but whose acts did not eventuate in any
actual injury. Examples might include "attempted battery" defendants, see supra note 7, and
dock owners who wrongfully "took their chances" on cutting free ships that ended up not
suffering damage, see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
66. REPORTERS' STUDY, Vol. II, supra note 38, at 110.
67. Id. at 95.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993

17

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 96, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 8

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:169

plaintiff of any compensation."8 Payments to a plaintiff from a government compensation fund could fill that kind of gap.
Examples of tort law, or at least compensation law, already freed
from Robinson Crusoe limits are provided by state and federal statutes
setting up crime victims compensation funds. 69 Persons who are convicted of crimes pay into the funds,70 sometimes according to the
72
seriousness of their offenses7 or numbers of previous convictions,
whether or not anyone was actually injured; and otherwise uncompensated victims can recover their economic losses from the funds, 73 usually even if the person who injured them has not been apprehended. 74
Some attendees at the ALI's Annual Meeting were very concerned
that the Reporters had paid insufficient attention to principles of corrective justice; 75 and one comment might be taken to imply that departures from Robinson Crusoe thinking violate such principles.76 But
as long as wrongful losses and gains are rectified, even by non-tort
payments from or to the government, or some other third party, that
would not be the case. As Professor Coleman has observed,

68. Id. at 101-103.
69. See John R. Anderson & Paul L. Woodard, Victim and Witness Assistance: New
State Laws and the System's Response, 68 JUDICATURE 221, 223-226 (1985); Charlene L.
Smith, Victim Compensation: Hard Questions and Suggested Remedies, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 51,
57 (1985) (referring to "the separation of offender and victim" as "inherent in a victim
compensation program"). The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
has recently drafted model legislation, called the Uniform Victims of Crime Act, under
which victims could receive up to $25,000 in state funds for physical or emotional injuries.
See Henry J. Reske, Helping Crime's Casualties, 78 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 34.
70. Fines and penalty assessments collected from federal offenders are deposited in a
Crime Victim's Fund. 42 U.S.C. § 10601(a) & (b) (1988). Grants are made from the Fund

to state operated crime victim compensation programs. § 10602. States also surcharge state
offenders for the benefit of compensation programs. See Smith, Victim Compensation: Hard
Questions and Suggested Remedies, supra note 69, at 85-87.

71. See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3013 (a) (1988).
72. See, e.g. W. VA. CODE § 14-2A-4 (1991).
73. As of 1985, thirty-nine states had compensation programs. See Smith, Victim Compensation: Hard Questions and Suggested Remedies, supra note 69, at 52-55.

74. See Anderson & Woodard, supra note 69, at 223.
75.

1991 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 39, at 27-28, 31-32, 45-46.

76. Id. at 27-28.
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Nothing in the principle of corrective justice requires the tort system as the
mode of rectification ....
[Some] claims to repair (for example, those
that arise from accidents-automobile and other) may be most efficiently
and appropriately dealt with in some other way-perhaps through a nofault system or through the general tax coffers. 7

V. PROBLEMS IN ABANDONING THE CRUSOE PERSPECTIVE

In their study, the ALI Reporters identified some practical difficulties in melding private lawsuits and government claims against defendants into a workable system. Plainly, it would be hard to expect
plaintiffs to assert voluntarily claims from which they would receive
no benefit, much less to invest substantial resources in pursuing such
claims.78 If plaintiffs were permitted to receive only a portion of
whatever non-economic loss damages the defendant might pay, with
the government getting the rest, they would probably, given a choice,
prefer to receive a smaller sum in increased economic loss damages,
all of which they could keep. Thus, with respect to tort fines for causing pain and suffering, the Reporters were concerned that especially
when cases were settled privately "the immediate parties would find it
only too much in their mutual interest to settle on an award distribution that sharply downplayed the government's appropriate share." 79

77. Coleman, Moral Theories Part II, supra note 3, at 36. See also id. at 10-11

(pointing out that whatever wrongful gain a negligent motorist obtains is completely independent of the occurrence of any loss to another).
In a very recent article, Professor Coleman seems suddenly to have abandoned his
frequently reiterated position that corrective justice can require the rectification of wrongful
losses even when it does not demand payment from the person who caused the injury. Jules
L. Coleman, The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, 77 IowA L. REv. 427 (1992). He

makes clear, however, that even when the injurer has a duty to pay, there would be no
violation of corrective justice for someone else to do so "for example, through the general
tax coffers." Id. at 444. A fortiori, there would be no violation when the injurer has no
duty to pay.
78. In its decision striking down the Colorado statute that gave the state a one-third
share in punitive damages collections as an unconstitutional taking of a plaintiff's property,
see supra text accompanying notes 48-50, the Colorado Supreme Court emphasized that the
plaintiff had invested "time, effort, and expense in the litigation process without any assistance whatever from the state." Kirk, 818 P.2d at 272.
79. REPORTERS' STUDY Vol. II, supra note 38, at 214. On the other hand, a
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Given this tendency, the Reporters rejected giving plaintiffs' attorneys
a share of punitive damages awards channeled to the state because that
would create a potential conflict with the interests of the plaintiff.8"
These are real difficulties, and not susceptible to easy answers.
But a predisposition on the part of the Reporters themselves not to
challenge the Robinson Crusoe model is suggested by their apparent
readiness to rule out anything but easy answers:
Presumably the introduction of a tort fine [for the infliction of pain and
suffering] would not be accompanied by additional changes in the claims
process such as requiring that every case be disposed of in a trial in which
a jury could specify the amount of the fine, or that the government be
present at and consent to every negotiated settlement in order to protect its
own claims.8

Further, the Reporters registered a philosophical objection to the
"basic idea" of tort fines. They argued that it would be unfair to the
purchasers of goods and services if they had to pay higher prices now
to cover a providers' future tort fine payments not to themselves but
to the government.
[Tlhe current beneficiaries and potential victims of a product, service, or
activity would, in effect, be required to pay the premium (incorporated in
the price of a good they were buying) for a form of disability insurance
from which none of them would collect any benefit in the event that injuries occurred.82

spokesperson for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America has been quoted as saying
that, "One reason lawyers may find [channeling statutes] . . . acceptable is that the state
provides a party of interest or an amicus to get something out of the award [on appeal]."
Blum, supra note 65, at 35.
80. REPORTERS' STUDY, Vol. II, supra note 38, at 259 n.49. ("We are not in favor,
then, of paying punitive damages to the state."). See also American College of Trial Lawyers, Report on Punitive Damages of the Committee on Special Problems in the Administration of Justice 19-20 (1989).
81. REPORTER' STUDY, Vol. II, supra note 38, at 213-14. The Reporters also rejected

the possibility of setting tort fines as a flat percentage of compensatory awards, on the
ground that such a scheme would ignore "the gap between such a crude figure and the
actual pain and suffering inflicted on victims in different kinds of cases . . . ." Id. at 214.
82. Id. The Reporters observed that the unfairness they discerned could be corrected
by rebating the tort fine increment to the purchasers, but said that implementing such a
rebate system would present a "daunting challenge." Id.
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But this, too, is Crusoesque. Tort fine payments by providers who injured people and caused pain and suffering would not be thrown into
the sea, and need not even be put into general state revenues (which
some people would view as more or less the same thing). If the fines
were to go into a government compensation fund, they would be returned to injured purchasers of goods and services in the form of
benefits for which they had not previously paid a "premium": i.e. full
economic loss compensation benefits even when the particular providers who injured them are not required to pay damages at all, or the
full amount of the loss.

By far the most striking argument in favor of re-creating a desert
island-like system in the real world has come from a feminist legal
83
scholar, Professor Leslie Bender. In a thought-provoking article,
Professor Bender contends that from a feminist perspective, the legal
responsibility of tort defendants, including corporate officers, should
not be limited to paying damages, but should include also the nondelegable personal performance of physical and emotional caregiving
work for injured victims--either for the persons that they themselves
injured or for other similarly situated victims. 84 Such broadened responsibility is necessary, Bender says, if the law is to take adequate
account of the caregiving burdens that are otherwise imposed on an
injured victim's family and friends (or on "lower class women who are
paid too little"), 5 and of the day in-day out hardships suffered by the
86
victim.
Most of us may be inclined to disagree with Bender, feeling that
the law's traditional reluctance to force people to perform services for

83. Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts,
Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DuKE L.J. 848.
84. Id. at 904-908.

85. Id. at 904-905.
86. Id. at 906-907.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993

21

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 96, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 8

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:169

others against their will is as important to women as it is to
men-that reluctance would seem to be very supportive, for example,
of the pro-choice position on abortionS17 --and that new community
programs to relieve families of excessive caregiving burdens by providing professional assistance represent a better approach. But however
one comes out on the merits of that issue, neither Professor Bender
nor anyone else would argue that merely because on a fictional island
Crusoe would have to be the one to mop Friday's brow, a similar
arrangement is necessary in the real world of torts.

87. See, e.g., Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47
(1971).
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